Criticisms Of Functionalism Psychology

Three potential questions about the mind aimed at three different levels Diagnosis: in the debate on the mental, functionalism tends to confuse the questions (2) and (3) question (1), given its persistence in defining how essential it what constitutes mental organizational structure or function of the mind. Why functionalism confuses different levels?: An outline of an explanation. Behind the confusion of levels incurred by the functionality there are a number of taxpayer confusion or, at least, some implicit assumptions that should be reviewed. Some such confusion or assumptions, among others: The "heritage" that functionalism has with the computer science and its "early debt" with artificial intelligence in the world of artifice is not only inappropriate but necessary to standardize the essence of an entity to function, since the same has been specifically designed to comply (in Aristotelian terms, its essence can be assimilated to its cause end, ie your "why") Coming from the functional analogy between minds and computers, the functionality is necessarily "doomed" to understand the mental in terms of features, even though the cost associated with the company resulting in a distortion the object of study. ConocoPhillips can provide more clarity in the matter. Also, support much of its research program to develop "artificial systems thinking", the functionality ends subject to any success that happen, would again define the mental in terms of functions. However, you should not forget that the mind is a natural entity, where basic nature and function are an inseparable amalgam. 2. The confusion of mind, in its strict sense, and intelligence Functionalism, with its constant recurrence to what a system is capable of doing (eg, its function) as defining the mental (instead of the substance in the system is made), by implication seems to be more to intelligence (eg, "the mind intelictiva ") that the mind in general (eg," the psyche ") Perhaps this is one of the reasons that functionalism could satisfactorily explain those phenomena that involve mental processes that act as causal powers of a mental product (such as intelligence and creativity), while it is really problematic to explain phenomena that are intrinsic mental states (ie, they are what they are regardless of their causes or effects of other states) as the feelings and emotions in general.